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In his article "Leibniz: Physics and Philosophy", Daniel Garber 
asserts that the early Leibniz was a mechanist and believed that 
"only God has the ability to move bodies by continually recreating 
them in different places...."1. Garber believes that these views, 
which Leibniz explicitly holds in the 1669 letter to Thomasius, 
support his claim that Leibniz accepted a version of occasionalism 
in that letter". Garber's case is a strong one, for the letter to 
Thomas ius develops ideas that are quite suggest ive of 
occasionalism. 
Nonetheless, this paper argues that Leibniz does not hold an 
occasionalistic notion of causation in the 1669 letter to Thomasius. 
Garber mistakenly ascribes occasionalism to the early Leibniz be-
cause he interprets Leibniz's views within a Cartesian framework. 
Only by understanding how Leibniz's Aristotelian concept of sub-
stance in the 1669 letter to Thomasius leads to a metaphysics quite 
distinct from Cartesianism 3 will it be clear why the ideas devel-
oped in that letter do not amount to occasionalism4. 
Leibniz makes at least four claims in the letter to Thomasius 
that are remarkably similar to claims made by Descartes. First, 
Leibniz accepts the signature feature of mechanical philosophy that 
"only magnitude, figure, and motion are to be used in explaining 
corporeal properties" 5. Second, Leibniz rejects the scholastic no-
tion of substantial forms in which "a kind of immaterial being, 
though insensible in bodies...spontaneously imparts motion to a 
body...without the help of an external thing" 6. Third, matter can-
not cause motion in itself, nor can motion arise out of matter spon-
taneously (i.e., without an external cause). Leibniz argues that 
because "we can assume nothing in bodies which does not follow 
from the definition of extension and antitypy [the attributes of 
matter,]...there is no motion, strictly speaking, as a real entity in 
bodies" 7. Finally, motion is explained by God's constantly creat-
ing things ex nihilo x. 
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These four commitments are recognizably Cartesian and are at 
least suggestive of occasionalism. The following argument is fa-
miliar from long use in the context of discussions regarding Carte-
sians and Cartesianism. Leibniz writes, "I have demonstrated...that 
whatever moves is continuously created [by God] and that bodies 
are something at any instant in assignable motion, but that they are 
nothing at any time midway between the instants in motion....I have 
found out...about the perpetual creation [by God] involved in mo-
tion...."9. In other words, the continuing existence of finite things 
depends on God's constant 'conservation' of things by perpetually 
creating them anew. 
As will become clear, constant creation does not by itself en-
tail occasionalism because finite things could be created with the 
power to cause things to happen. Finite things created with causal 
powers could themselves be secondary causes insofar as God con-
tinues to conserve them. Consequently, establishing conservatism 
does not establish occasionalism. 
At this point, a brief discussion of the traditional distinctions 
between conservatism, occasionalism and concurrentism will be 
useful. Conservatism is the view that things exist only because 
God constantly sustains them or, as Descartes and Leibniz hold, 
constantly recreates them ex nihilo. Occasionalism is the view 
that every natural phenomenon has God as its primary or first cause 
and, furthermore, that God is the only cause of such phenomena. 
An occasionalist believes that there are no genuine secondary (i.e., 
creaturely) causes in nature 1 0 . Concurrentism is similar to 
occasionalism in that both views accept God as an immediate cause 
of every natural phenomenon. However, concurrentists argue that 
corporeal substances have causal powers that are independent of 
the causal power of God: "Such powers are not, they insist, sup-
planted or rendered otiose by God's causal activity in the world. 
Instead, God contributes to the ordinary course of nature only as a 
universal or general cause who cooperates with or concurs with 
secondary causes"". 
The fourth of the above mentioned claims from the 1669 letter 
to Thomasius establishes that Leibniz accepted conservatism. 
However, conservatism is compatible with both occasionalism and 
concurrentism. Occasionalism follows only if there are no sec-
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ondary causes acting as at least partial causes distinct from the 
primary cause (i.e., God). The scholastics, who claimed that there 
are secondary causes, had little difficulty explaining the possibil-
ity of creaturely causation because their picture of the universe 
contained dynamic substantial forms which endowed finite things 
with the power to cause action. The mechanists' situation was 
different. They believed that all corporeal properties could be ex-
plained in terms of magnitude, figure and motion, and they be-
lieved that all changes in corporeal things were explainable in terms 
of motion. For the Cartesian, however, corporeal bodies consist 
solely of matter (res externa), while motion is not a property of 
and cannot be produced by matter. 
Descartes never included causal efficacy in his lists of the quali-
ties of extension. Indeed, causal efficacy, as a real quality or ca-
pacity, might be incompatible with Descartes' geometric picture 
of the world, which consists of nothing but extended substance 
and its modes . As Rodis-Lewis wri tes , "Descar tes 
fonde...l 'autonomies de la physique mecaniste: le mode de 
l'objectivite scientifique est purifie de son revetement qualitatif et 
de tout dynamisme interne" ". If Rodis-Lewis is correct in claim-
ing that Descartes succeeded in describing a universe without quali-
ties or internal dynamic powers, then it is hard to see how corpo-
real body could be or have within it a secondary cause of motion. 
If one corporeal body (A) strikes another (B) which then changes 
in some way and occasionalism is rejected, then there must be some-
thing about A that is at least a partial cause of B's changing. Given 
Descartes' mechanistic physics, the cause of the change in B must 
be the motion moving its parts. By definition, however, motion is 
not a real entity in matter: there is nothing to be transferred from A 
to B. Furthermore, A has no internal causal power by which it 
could cause B to move; only something external to both A and B 
could cause B to move. For Descartes, that external thing is God 1 3 . 
And, of course, this is generalizable to all body-body interactions. 
All change in body results from motion, and motion is the result of 
God's constantly creating matter. 
The problem is clear and can be pinpointed by noting how 
Descartes tends to identify divine conservation and divine concur-
rence. In a letter to Mersenne and in his response to Hyperaspistes, 
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he writes of his acceptance of divine concurrence but describes a 
view that can only be described as conservation 1 4. Descartes never 
explains concurrence except by appealing to conservation. Divine 
concurrence requires that there be secondary causes with which 
God can concur, but in Descartes' world of extended things there 
is nothing that could serve as a secondary cause. All changes are 
due to the motion caused by God's eternal recreation, and finite 
objects are causally impotent. 
It should be noted that Leibniz could have been influenced by 
this sort of argument even if Descartes is not completely respon-
sible for it. There is no doubt that the argument, which began to 
gain prominence in the late 1660's, is a characteristically Carte-
sian argument. Consider, for example, the early Cartesian Louis 
de la Forge, who made the following three claims. First, we clearly 
and distinctly conceive of body as purely passive and containing 
no active force. Second, motion is nothing more than a mode of a 
body and, as such, cannot pass from one body to another. Third, 
God conserves the world in the sense that he creates it ex nihilo at 
each moment. La Forge concluded that occasionalism must obtain 
in the context of body-body interaction: no body can move itself or 
another body, and, therefore, no body can cause any natural events. 
When Garber calls Leibniz an occasionalist, he interprets 
Leibniz as accepting a Cartesian view of this sort. Thus, when 
Garber writes that "Leibniz held that God is the only real source of 
activity in the world and real cause of motion in the physical 
world" 1 5 ,1 believe he is understanding Leibniz to have held the 
sort of view outlined above. This view stems from the four claims 
in the letter to Thomasius previously discussed, and it asserts that 
the lack of internal dynamism in a mechanistic world without sub-
stantial forms, the fact that all change is caused by motion and the 
fact that God causes motion through continual recreation entails 
occasionalism. 
But Leibniz's account of causality in the letter to Thomasius 
of 1669 is not occasionalistic. While he held the four 'mechanist' 
claims, the early Leibniz was not simply a mechanical philoso-
pher. Rather, he was a reformer 1 6. While he accepts the "rule 
which is common to all these renovators of philosophy [i.e., the 
mechanists]" 1 7, he also proclaims his determination to reconcile 
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the mechanical philosophy with Aristotelianism. Thus, he writes 
that "the one question is whether Aristotle's abstract theories of 
matter, form, and change can be explained by magnitude, figure, 
and motion" 1 8 . For the purposes of this paper, Leibniz's attempt to 
bring mechanism into accordance with an Aristotelian notion of 
substance is particularly relevant. 
Cartesianism naturally tends towards occasionalism because 
res extensa, of which all corporeal things are supposedly consti-
tuted, does not contain and cannot produce motion. As we have 
seen, Leibniz accepts an analogue of res extensa. He writes, "pri-
mary matter is mass itself, in which there is nothing but extension 
and antitypy or impenetrability" 1 9. Leibniz identifies Aristotelian 
primary matter and Cartesian res extensa. However, Leibniz strik-
ingly differs with Cartesianism in that he does not believe that matter 
is a substance, as the following considerations show. First, Leibniz 
accepts the Aristotelian notion that substances are self-sufficient' . 
Something is self-sufficient in the Aristotelian sense only if all of 
its properties can be explained by its nature. Second, Leibniz ac-
cepts the mechanist claim that all corporeal properties can be ex-
plained in terms of motion, figure and magnitude. Third, motion is 
not a part of the nature of matter, and matter has a figure only 
because motion acts on it 2 1 . Matter is a continuous and homog-
enous mass" , but division "comes from motion, the bounding of 
parts comes from division, their figures comes from this bounding, 
and forms from figures; therefore, forms come from motion"" . 
Motion produces figure by acting upon matter to divide and bound 
portions of it. While corporeal properties are explained by magni-
tude, figure and motion, figure and motion are not included in and 
cannot be produced from the nature of matter alone. Consequently, 
matter alone cannot explain a corporeal thing's properties. By it-
self, matter is incapable of having any properties but extension and 
antitypy. Leibniz believes that matter is not causally self-suffi-
cient, for which reason he denies that it is a substance. 
Because of the insubstantiality of matter, Leibniz draws a very 
non-Cartesian distinction between matter and body 2 4 . He writes, 
we can assume nothing in bodies which does not 
follow from the definition of extension and 
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antitypy. But from these concepts....Motion itself 
is not derived....Hence there is no motion, strictly 
speaking, as a real entity in bodies. I have dem-
onstrated, instead, that whatever moves is continu-
ously created and that bodies...are nothing at any 
time midway between the instants in motion... 2 5. 
This passage is unclear because Leibniz fails to distinguish be-
tween matter (prime matter) and body. Nonetheless, it is clear that 
a distinction is being drawn between bodies in which 'there is no 
motion' and 'continuously created' bodies that move and are noth-
ing between the instants of motion. I believe the distinction is 
based on the following reasoning. To be a proper substance, body 
must account for magnitude, form and motion; it must be the prod-
uct of the interaction between matter and motion. In this interac-
tion the true Aristotelianism of Leibniz's account of substance is 
clear. Matter (primary matter) is nothing but a continuous, ho-
mogenous passive mass until it is acted upon by an active force 
(motion) that divides matter into forms and sustains their organi-
zation. Body is matter that has been organized into a form by 
motion. It exists only insofar as the acting of motion upon its mat-
ter is constant, for body loses its form and reverts to matter as soon 
as motion stops 'activating' it 2 6 . In short, body is formed matter, 
and form is matter in motion. As we have seen, motion is just 
God's creation of things in different places. In other words, it is 
God's constant recreation of matter in organized forms that pro-
vides the activity to the passive matter of bodies. Matter is sub-
stance only insofar as it is being conserved as a body by motion 
(i.e., by God's creative power). Because body consists of matter in 
motion and has a form, it can explain its properties. For this rea-
son, Leibniz takes body rather than matter to be substance. 
Keeping in mind Leibniz's distinction between body and mat-
ter and his Aristotelian notion of corporeal substance as matter or-
ganized by motion, it is possible to understand how Leibniz avoids 
occasionalism. Whereas the Cartesian corporeal world of res 
extensa is a morass of undifferentiated extended stuff, Leibniz's 
corporeal world consists of organized bodies with figures formed 
by God. Despite the prima facie contradiction, Leibniz believes 
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that once matter is organized it can operate as a cause of motion, as 
he explains in the following passage: 
form is indeed the cause and principle of motion, 
but not the primary one. No body moves unless it 
is moved from without....For example, assume a 
sphere to be on a plane. If it is once at rest, it will 
not move by itself in all eternity, unless an exter-
nal impulsion is added, for example, another body. 
In that case the other body is the cause of the im-
pressed motion....I admit therefore that form is the 
principle of motion within its own body, and that 
body is itself the principle of motion in another 
body. But the first principle of motion is the pri-
mary form [which, in the case of corporeal things, 
is God]" 2 7 . 
This picture is clearly analogous to the scholastic picture in which 
God conserves things and endows them with substantial forms that 
have powers of their own. In this view, there are secondary causes 
to the extent that God continues to create things and endow them 
with dynamic causal powers. Leibniz rejects the substantial forms 
of the scholastics but replaces them with organized bodies that have 
causal powers as long as God continually maintains their organi-
zation. Rather than having dynamic substantial forms, Leibniz's 
bodies are active insofar as God keeps them organized. The orga-
nization of a body is its nature, which gives the body causal effi-
cacy. In this way, Leibniz's view avoids occasionalism. 
Le ibn iz ' s concept of body might seem prob lemat ic . 
Cartesianism tends to collapse into occasionalism because its geo-
metric picture of the world contains nothing that could be a sec-
ondary cause. In the mechanist picture, substantial forms are re-
placed by motion; the mechanist explains all change in terms of 
motion operating on corporeal things. For Descartes, however, 
God seems to be the only cause of motion, as motion appears to be 
nothing more than God's creating things in succeeding places. If 
motion is supposed to replace substantial forms and is caused di-
rectly by God, then occasionalism eventually follows. By claim-
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ing that bodies are secondary causes, isn't Leibniz making an in-
coherent claim? If all change is caused by motion, then bodies 
could cause change only by causing motion. Motion is either caused 
solely by God's recreating things or is caused in part by finite things. 
If Leibniz means to make the latter claim, he would seem to be 
reintroducing dynamic properties to what seems to be a world 
stripped of all dynamism and assigning them to things (bodies) 
that seem unsuited to having dynamic properties. Body, despite 
being organized, is still nothing but matter in a particular form, 
and there is nothing about being formed that entails possessing 
dynamic properties. 
However, I believe that a case can be made for the claim that 
in the letter to Thomasius of 1669 Leibniz offers a coherent mecha-
nistic account that avoids occasionalism. To see this it will be 
helpful to juxtapose the Cartesian position with Leibniz's. For the 
Cartesian, all corporeal things are made solely of res extensa and 
have motion only because God recreates them in different places. 
In other words, the nature of a Cartesian body is to be extended, 
and such bodies have motion as a mode insofar as God causes them 
to move. Moreover, all body-body causality, which must be ex-
plained in terms of local motion, can only be the result of God's 
constant recreation of finite things. Motion, in this sense, is only 
the 'transportation' of a body from "the vicinity of the other bodies 
which are in immediate contact with it...to the vicinity of other 
bodies" 2 8 . 
In the 1669 letter to Thomasius, Leibniz seems to agree that 
motion is nothing more than the 'transportation' of matter from 
one place to another through God's constant recreation of it. Like-
wise, Leibniz seems to agree that the nature of matter is extension 
(and antitypy). However, Leibniz's world includes bodies. Bod-
ies consist of matter in motion, but they have a nature that is dis-
tinct from matter. In other words, bodies are not simply heaps of 
matter that are 'transported' by God. Rather, the nature of body is 
to be matter in motion. Whereas a 'Cartesian body' has res extensa 
as its nature and might be in motion, a 'Leibnizian body' has 
matter's being in motion as its nature. Motion is an essential part 
of a Leibnizian body. Consequently, a Leibnizian body has the 
ability to cause motion in itself and other things and, therefore, has 
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causal efficacy. A Cartesian body, on the other hand, does not 
have causal efficacy because whatever motion it has is not part of 
its nature. 
The Cartesian and the Leibnizian views are easily confused 
because Leibnizian bodies are in motion only insofar as God puts 
them in motion. This makes it seem as though the motion does not 
really belong to body at all. As we have seen, however, some scho-
lastics believed that God had an analogous role in the context of 
substantial forms: they claimed that things have substantial forms 
to the extent that God constantly creates them with substantial 
forms. Such a view is compatible with the claim that finite things 
are secondary causes because of their dynamic substantial forms. 
Likewise, the claim that finite things are in motion only insofar as 
God puts them in motion is compatible with the claim that finite 
things are the source of secondary causes that are not 'supplanted 
or rendered otiose by God's causal activity in nature.' It is for this 
reason that Leibniz is not an occasionalist in the letter to Thomasius 
of 1669. 
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